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THE PERFECT STORM? OPIOID EPIDEMIC MEETS COVID-19
PANDEMIC: REEVALUATING THE ROLE THE RYAN HAIGHT ACT
AND THE DEA PLAY IN THE FUTURE OF SAFE ACCESS TO
VIRTUAL HEALTHCARE
Allison Gray*
The COVID-19 pandemic facilitated a dramatic shift to a
reliance upon virtual means for communication, education, and
work-from-home careers. In addition, there was a surge in
telehealth appointments as an alternative to the traditional inperson provision-of-care model. However, COVID-19 was not
operating in isolation but rather in conjunction with the worsening
opioid epidemic. Unfortunately, the two public health emergencies
coinciding with the rapid development and dependency upon
telemedicine created the perfect breeding grounds for illicit online
pharmacies to take root and grow into massive criminal
organizations that illegally distribute controlled substances, such as
opioids. Limited federal legislation and the patchwork of state
legislation is insufficient to manage the serious risk these illicit
online pharmacies pose to the public’s safety. Thus, it is necessary
to enact further legislation that maximizes the protections against
illicit online pharmacies while minimizing collateral burdens and
barriers to care, especially for vulnerable populations that need
telehealth the most. While it is desirable that Congress enact further
legislation to this end, given the immediate need presented by illicit
online pharmacies, it is best to divert resources towards the Drug
Enforcement Agency, specifically the Diversion Control Division, to
increase enforcement and produce additional guidance, as well as
educational materials.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of the highly infectious coronavirus disease
(“COVID-19”) and the resulting pandemic drastically altered the
landscape and trajectory of advancements in the healthcare
industry.1 Although Americans watched COVID-19 slowly travel

1

See Asim Kichloo et al., Telemedicine, the Current COVID-19 Pandemic and the
Future: a Narrative Review and Perspectives Moving Forward in the USA, NAT’L CTR.
FOR
BIOTECH. INFO. (Aug. 18, 2020), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC7437610/#R3 [https://perma.cc/JKP3-QJSY] (discussing the rise in
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from continent to continent, anticipating its continued spread, there
was still an aura of disbelief when the virus arrived on U.S. soil in
February of 2020.2 Identifying the virus as an impending danger, the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) advised
Americans across the country, including healthcare providers, to
implement social distancing guidelines to slow the spread of the
virus and protect the country’s most vulnerable populations.3 One
crucially important aspect of these guidelines was the CDC’s
recommendation that healthcare facilities offer clinical services
virtually, which sparked an ensuing surge in the use of
telemedicine.4
Telemedicine is a specific subset of telehealth, defined as “a
service that seeks to improve a patient’s health by permitting twoway, real-time interactive communication between the patient and
the physician at a distant site.”5 Telehealth, on the other hand, is a
broader concept that encompasses telemedicine, as well as any
“technology used to collect and transmit patient data such as
telephones, email and remote patient monitoring (RPM) devices to
provide health education or ancillary healthcare services.”6
Somewhat surprisingly, the concept of telemedicine originates from
the “use of ancient hieroglyphs and scrolls to share information

the importance of telemedicine in response to COVID-19, as well as future
implications of the increase in usage of telemedicine for the future of medicine).
2
See Andrew Selsky, Wash. State Sees 1st Virus Death, NBC DFW (Feb. 24, 2020),
https://www.nbcdfw.com/news/coronavirus/person-in-washington-state-first-in-us-todie-from-new-virus/2321864/ [https://perma.cc/X5W3-QLR8] (reporting that panic
did not really ensue until after the first death in the United States as a result of the
COVID-19 virus, which was immediately followed by the declaration of a state
of emergency by Washington state, causing immense anxiety and compelling
people to suddenly clear the shelves of stores of important necessities).
3
See Lisa M. Koonin et al., Trends in the Use of Telehealth During the Emergence
of the COVID-19 Pandemic — United States, January–March 2020, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Oct. 30, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/
volumes/69/wr/mm6943a3.htm [https://perma.cc/5GF3-VRZP].
4
See id.
5
Kichloo et al., supra note 1, at 1 (quoting Telehealth, MEDICAID.GOV,
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/benefits/telemedicine/index.html [https://perma.
cc/B6ZB-Z2E5]).
6
Id.
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about health-related events such as outbreaks or epidemics.”7 In
more modern times, the concept of telemedicine stems from
astronauts and advancements in space exploration. Specifically, the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (“NASA”) was
instrumental in delegating resources for the development of
telemedicine in order to provide medical care to astronauts by
monitoring their vitals, determining diagnoses, and providing
treatment while in space.8 Today, within the context of COVID-19,
telemedicine is a vital solution to medical care accessibility barriers
caused by the combination of a highly infectious disease and a
healthcare system built on an in-person provision-of-care model.9
With the emergence of COVID-19, the reliance upon
telemedicine grew exponentially. One study revealed that in April
of 2020, “overall telehealth utilization for office visits and outpatient
care was 78-times higher than in February 2020.”10 Although experts
acknowledge the shift from in-person appointments to telemedicine
was “borne out of necessity,” they also believe several factors
contributed to telemedicine’s ability to take root in today’s medical
system and grow to unprecedented levels as an option for the
provision of medical care.11 These factors include: (1) “increased
consumer willingness to use telehealth”; (2) “increased provider
willingness to use telehealth”; and, (3) “regulatory changes enabling

7

See id. at 2 (detailing the origins of telemedicine beginning with hieroglyphs,
then the use of telegraphs during the Civil War, and then the use of
videoconferencing for telepsychiatry in 1959).
8
See id.
9
Sirina Keesara et al., Covid-19 and Health Care’s Digital Revolution, NEW
ENG. J. MED. (2020), https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp2005835
[https://perma.cc/W9Q5-724G] (“This [in-person] care structure contributes to
the spread of the virus to uninfected patients who are seeking evaluation.
Vulnerable populations such as patients with multiple chronic conditions or
immunosuppression will face the difficult choice between risking iatrogenic
Covid-19 exposure during a clinician visit and postponing needed care.”).
10
Oleg Bestsennyy et al., Telehealth: A Quarter-Trillion-Dollar Post-COVID19 Reality?, MCKINSEY & CO. (July 9, 2021), https://www.mckinsey.com/
industries/healthcare-systems-and-services/our-insights/telehealth-a-quartertrillion-dollar-post-covid-19-reality [https://perma.cc/9VBG-NXE2].
11
See id.
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greater access and reimbursement.”12 In effect, these factors enabled
telehealth to build a “bridge to care.”13
Today, the use of telemedicine is still significantly higher than
before the COVID-19 pandemic, although its prevalence has
decreased since the initial spike that occurred soon after the
pandemic began.14 In July of 2021, medical professionals observed
a plateau in telehealth appointment demand; however, the
subsequent surge in cases due to the even more infectious Delta
variant correlated with another surge in telehealth appointment
requests.15
Just as the prevalence of infections from the Delta variant was
decreasing, a new variant called Omicron16 reinforced the newfound
reliance on telehealth. Despite the more widespread availability of
COVID-19 vaccinations, breakthrough infections persisted,
although serious hospitalizations and deaths were reduced by
vaccinations and booster shots.17 As a result of the everchanging
conditions with the mutating virus, the pandemic has created a world
where virtual interactions, such as those between a patient and
doctor, are considered normal.
With no end to the COVID-19 pandemic in sight, there has been
a substantial increased investment18 in telehealth, solidifying
telemedicine as a fixture in healthcare systems’ offered services.
The Mayo Clinic expects telemedicine to eventually be fully
integrated into the healthcare system and has indicated that
“telemedicine will become a force multiplier, given its ability to
12

Id.
Id.
14
See Bestsennyy, supra note 10 (“As of July 2021 . . . [t]elehealth utilization
has stabilized at levels 38X higher than before the pandemic.”).
15
See Emily Anthes, The Delta Variant: What Scientists Know, N.Y. TIMES
(June 22, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/22/health/delta-variantcovid.html [https://perma.cc/64N7-DGSU].
16
Omicron Variant: What You Need to Know, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Feb. 2, 2022), https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2021/s1201omicron-variant.html [https://perma.cc/UZU3-EUBF].
17
See id.
18
Bestsennyy, supra note 10 (“Investment in virtual care and digital health
more broadly has skyrocketed, fueling further innovation, with 3X the level of
venture capitalist digital health investment in 2020 than it had in 2017.”).
13
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scale care, improve the efficiency of workflows, and expand
provider reach to underserved areas, including rural or
geographically isolated populations globally.”19 Additionally, the
Mayo Clinic has explained that telemedicine will improve in-home
care by making sure patients follow their individualized care plans
administered remotely, thereby reducing hospitalizations.20 Not only
can virtual visits be used to monitor providers’ patients at home, but
“text, email and mobile phone applications as well as data from
wearable devices can be used to share information between patients
and clinicians.”21
The COVID-19 pandemic has facilitated the expansion of
medical care accessibility by utilizing existing technologies but
revolutionizing them with a new purpose, evidenced by the
newfound ability to obtain prescriptions from online pharmacies.
Despite telemedicine’s increased uses going forward, the
advancements of telehealth are still shackled to legislation of the
past. In 2008, Congress passed the Ryan Haight Act (“RHA”) as an
attempt to directly target online pharmacies.22 Amending the
Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), the most notable addition
included in the RHA is the requirement that a patient must have at
least one in-person meeting with a doctor before receiving a
prescription for a controlled substance.23 Amidst the COVID-19
pandemic, this in-person requirement proved to be a significant
obstacle to individuals obtaining their medications in a safe, socially
distanced manner.
When COVID-19 prompted the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (“HHS”) to issue a public health emergency
19

Zelalem Temesgen et al., Health Care After the COVID-19 Pandemic and
the Influence of Telemedicine, MAYO CLINIC (Sept. 1, 2020), https://
www.mayoclinicproceedings.org/article/S0025-6196(20)30789-8/fulltext [https://
perma.cc/EA4Q-Y4MV]; see also Kichloo et al., supra note 1 (“Virtual
appointments may provide specialty care to populations where it otherwise may
not be available, such as those living in rural areas, deployed on military
assignments or in prisons.”).
20
See Temesgen et al., supra note 19.
21
Kichloo et al., supra note 1, at 1.
22
21 U.S.C. § 829(e)(1).
23
Id.
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declaration,24 the declaration triggered an exception to the CSA so
that the provision requiring an in-person medical evaluation to
receive controlled substances would no longer be enforced by the
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”).25 Although it will
take years to know the effectiveness of this pandemic-related policy
change orchestrated by the DEA,26 the in-person requirement has
likely both protected some patients from illicit online pharmacies,
while simultaneously creating an obstacle to medical care access for
others. The rollback of the in-person provision of the RHA provides
the unique opportunity to reassess its inclusion in the future
regulation of illicit online pharmacies.
While this Article explains the patchwork of state law and the
barriers to successful compliance for online pharmacies, this Article
focuses on the reevaluation of the in-person requirement included in
the RHA, as well as the role the DEA is playing and can play in
stymieing the opioid crisis that has been exacerbated due to the
combination of COVID-19 and the rise of telemedicine. While the
in-person medical evaluation was implemented with good
intentions, the unintended result of preventing medical care access
for certain individuals provides an illustrative example to help guide
the future mindset when regulating online pharmacies. Specifically,
future regulations of illicit online pharmacies must focus on
providing the most protection against illicit online pharmacies while
minimizing collateral burdens and barriers to care, especially for
vulnerable populations that need telehealth the most.
Although there are benefits to online pharmacies, the extreme
dangers presented by the distribution of opioids by illicit online
pharmacies requires careful consideration of the future of the RHA
24

Public Health Emergency Declarations, DIVERSION CONTROL DIV.,
https://www.phe.gov/emergency/news/healthactions/phe/Pages/default.aspx
[https://perma.cc/RGR3-XXUV] (last visited Sept. 30, 2021).
25
COVID-19 Information Page, DIVERSION CONTROL DIV., https://
www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/ZB7L-8X4T]
(last visited Sept. 30, 2021).
26
Libby Baney et al., The Future of Telehealth and the Ryan Haight Act PostPandemic, NAT’L ASS’N BDS. PHARMACY (Apr. 22, 2021) https://
nabp.pharmacy/news/blog/the-future-of-telehealth-and-the-ryan-haight-act-postpandemic/ [https://perma.cc/VU6J-5E2D].
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and the continued role the DEA can play in stymieing the crisis.
While Congressional action would be desirable to remedy the
patchwork of statutes enacted by individual states regulating online
pharmacies, such action cannot be taken fast enough to address the
immediate need presented by illicit online pharmacies. Therefore,
the DEA is best-situated to strike the balance of providing
protections against these pharmacies, while minimizing the burdens
to the populations that rely on virtual medical care. Consequently,
the DEA should utilize its broad grant of authority to enhance
regulation of illicit online pharmacies. To effectively combat these
illegal operations and their contributions to the opioid endemic, the
DEA may require increased funding directed to the Diversion
Control Division (“DCD”), circulating additional guidance
requiring more robust relationships between prescribing physicians
and patients, and prioritizing the development of effective
enforcement strategies.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part II explores both the
significant benefits, as well as the serious risks of telemedicine. Part
III summarizes the tragic history of the opioid epidemic to
contextualize how illicit online pharmacies contributed to that crisis.
Part IV analyzes the statutory and regulatory structure related to
online pharmacies, past and present, and at both the federal and state
levels, and illuminates the inconsistencies in online pharmacy
regulations amongst the states. Part V utilizes a study analyzing
illicit online pharmacy prosecutions to focus on specific charges and
imposed penalties. Finally, Part VI addresses the cracks in current
U.S. law and regulatory schemes exposed and exacerbated by the
COVID-19 pandemic and explores solutions, such as the adoption
of a universalized Model State Legislation for the regulation of
online pharmacies at the state level. However, this Article suggests
that the best option to ensure safe access to telemedicine is
ultimately for Congress to pass a statute standardizing the regulation
of illicit online pharmacies amongst the states. But in the meantime,
increased efforts and initiatives from the DEA are necessary.
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II. THE SIGNIFICANT BENEFITS AND SERIOUS RISKS OF
TELEMEDICINE
The advancements in telemedicine have provided a plethora of
benefits by delivering medical care virtually. Despite these benefits,
the rapid growth of telemedicine has also created a suitable
environment for illicit online pharmacies to flourish. Thus, it is
important to identify the benefits of telemedicine to balance them
against the severity of risk presented by illicit online pharmacies.
This balancing can be utilized to inform future regulations by
providing maximum protections against such illegal operations
while minimizing the obstacles preventing access to virtual care. In
this way, regulations can work to ensure that the benefits
successfully outweigh the risks.
A. Significant Benefits of Telemedicine
The inherent characteristics of telemedicine, including
convenience and efficiency, certainly make it an attractive model for
delivering healthcare services. The ease with which patients can
receive care in the comfort of their home encourages individuals to
seek medical care as soon as they suspect care is needed, rather than
procrastinating due to the inconvenience of traveling to a doctor’s
office.27 Seeking medical care sooner can lead to earlier diagnoses
and more timely treatment.28 Further, telemedicine “can bring care
to patients who may have difficulty traveling to their appointments,
such as the elderly, the disabled, or those lacking sufficient
transportation.”29
In addition to the convenience, there is a significant efficiency
aspect associated with telemedicine; it makes the provision of
medical care more expedient. “Between travel time to healthcare
facilities, waiting room time, and time actually obtaining medical
care, Americans spend an average of 123 [minutes] per visit, with
an average face-to-face time with a physician of 20.5 [minutes].”30

27

See Temesgen et al., supra note 19.
See id.
29
Kichloo et al., supra note 1, at 6.
30
Id.
28
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Finally, telemedicine can also add an additional revenue stream
for providers,31 as well as reduce the healthcare industry’s carbon
footprint.32 While all of these benefits certainly make telemedicine
attractive, the Mayo Clinic has warned “careful planning” and
“continued scrutiny” will be required as telemedicine is
implemented33—and for good reason, considering the associated
risks telemedicine presents.
B. Serious Risks of Telemedicine
Although telemedicine has substantial and important benefits,
there is concern that the disadvantages may outweigh the benefits.
One current challenge to telemedicine is the “lack of consumer
awareness regarding . . . access to it, its services and its cost.”34
According to a study conducted in 2019, “74.3% of consumers are
unaware or believe their health system does not offer telemedicine
services,”35 which is especially true in rural areas.36
Even more persuasive is the fact that telemedicine is viewed
with skepticism by those who need healthcare services the most. In
fact, the same 2019 study revealed “0% of customers who indicated
their health as ‘poor’ reported using telemedicine in the past year,”
highlighting a major concern that the community members who
really should be reaping the benefits of telemedicine are not utilizing
the service at all.37 For those who do use telemedicine, many have
voiced serious concerns about the security of their personal health
information.38 But the biggest threat of all might be one that patients
31

See id. (“[E]xpanding a practice’s reach into new communities without the
need to move locations. In addition, the option of telemedicine services within a
practice may attract new consumers who would otherwise be unwilling to seek
medical care.”).
32
See id. (“Replacing in-person visits with telemedicine appointments has the
potential to decrease carbon emissions via reducing travel to and from
appointments.”).
33
See Temesgen et al., supra note 19.
34
Kichloo et al., supra note 1, at 6.
35
Id.
36
See id.
37
See id.
38
See id.; see also Keesara et al., supra note 9 (“Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) has announced that it is using its enforcement discretion
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have yet to fully realize: the collateral rise of illicit online
pharmacies.
C. Arguably the Biggest Telemedicine Threat: Illicit Online Pharmacies
The growth of telemedicine has created a suitable environment
for illicit online pharmacies to flourish. Although the first online
pharmacy was established in 1999,39 the recent increased reliance on
virtually-delivered health care has heightened the demand for online
pharmacies—but not all of these pharmacies are law-abiding
operations. A study conducted in 2016 by the Center for Safe
Internet Pharmacies found:
Illicit online pharmacies are a far more common occurrence in the digital
sphere than legitimate ones, with internet security firms estimating that
96% of all global online pharmacies actually operate illegally by failing
to adhere to regulatory and safety requirements and are ergo in violation
of professional, legal and ethical principles.40

This statistic demonstrates the imminent danger most of these
illicit online pharmacies pose to the public’s safety. Specifically
related to the possibility of illicit pharmacies distributing controlled
substances illegally is the threat that such actions are bound to be
exacerbated by governments easing restrictions and oversight
associated with virtual medical care to increase access to health care
in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The response by the DEA
and the determination of the RHA’s future applicability are two key
considerations moving forward when thinking about how to provide
the appropriate safeguards to neutralize the threat posed by illicit
online pharmacies, especially in the midst of the opioid epidemic.

and will not impose penalties for using HIPAA-noncompliant private
communications technologies to provide telehealth services during this public
health emergency.”).
39
See Tim K. Mackey & Gaurvika Nayyar, Digital Danger: A Review of the
Global Public Health, Patient Safety and Cybersecurity Threats Posed By Illicit
Online Pharmacies, 118 BRITISH MED. BULL. 115, 116 (2016).
40
See id. (citing The Internet Pharmacy Market in 2016: Trends, Challenges
and Opportunities, LEGALSCRIPT.COM, (Jan. 2016), http://safemedsonline.org/
wp-content/uploads/2016/01/The-Internet-Pharmacy-Market-in-2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AFB3-88AS].)
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III. BACKGROUND ON THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC
Around 3400 B.C. the Sumerians in Mesopotamia cultivated the
poppy plant, naming the plant Hul Fil, or the “joy plant,” after
observing its effect on individuals who consumed it.41 Over time, the
poppy plant rapidly spread across all major civilizations but
eventually transformed into a form commonly known in modern
times as opioids. Derived from the poppy plant as a treatment for
pain, opioids became the “magic wand”42 for pain treatment in the
nineteenth century, leading to overprescribing of the pain
medication and eventually sparking concerns about its abuse and
potential to be addictive.43 The worries of the addictive qualities of
opioids during the twentieth century led to the “widely held
perception among professionals in the United States that the longterm use of opioid therapy to treat chronic pain was contraindicated
by the risk of addiction, increased disability and lack of efficacy
over time.”44 Although medical professionals were the ones
prescribing opioids, seemingly with no restrictions, doctors were not
the primary facilitator of the resulting opioid crisis.
Surprisingly, however, steps taken by the federal government is
what sparked increased opioid usage in the United States.45 In 1935,
Congress passed the Social Security Act, which, among other things,
created the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”),
a federal agency, and mandated that the CMS establish “minimum
health and safety and standards that must be met by providers and

41

Andrew Rosenblum et al., Opioids and the Treatment of Chronic Pain:
Controversies, Current Status, and Future Directions, NAT’L CTR. FOR BIOTECH. INFO.
(July 16, 2009), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2711509/ [https://
perma.cc/CZA3-CRM6].
42
Erick Trickey, Inside the Story of America’s 19th-Century Opiate Addiction,
SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/
inside-story-americas-19th-century-opiate-addiction-180967673/ [https://perma.cc/
UJ3R-KMY6].
43
See Rosenblum et al., supra note 41.
44
Id.
45
See Quality, Safety & Oversight - Certification & Compliance, CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Jan. 12, 2022), https://www.cms.gov/
Medicare/Provider-Enrollment-and-Certification/CertificationandComplianc [https://
perma.cc/L4AN-UGZU].
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suppliers participating in the Medicare and Medicaid programs.”46
The Joint Commission, a nonprofit that accredits hospitals to receive
funding from Medicare and Medicaid, worked with CMS to create
a set of standards to receive funding.47
Then, in 1996, Purdue Pharma aggressively marketed
OxyContin, claiming that “[o]ne dose relieves pain for 12 hours,
more than twice as long as generic medications.”48 In 1980, in
support of the safety of OxyContin, a group of doctors wrote a letter
to the New England Journal of Medicine, which has been
erroneously cited for the assertion that “the risk of addiction [to
OxyContin] was less than one percent.”49 With “dubious or
misinterpreted research” widely publicized,50 Purdue Pharma
encouraged doctors to prescribe higher doses—as opposed to more
frequent doses—when the pain relief did not last twelve hours.51
This suggestion contradicted research “show[ing] that the more
potent the dose of an opioid such as OxyContin, the greater the
possibility of overdose and death.”52
In 2001, the Joint Commission implemented new pain
assessment and management standards for hospitals.53 The revised
standards encouraged that more attention be delegated to pain
management,54 and doctors and nurses started implementing
46

Id.
Standards Development Process, JOINT COMM’N https://www.joint
commission.org/standards/about-our-standards/ [https://perma.cc/TB7G-CDRF] (last
visited Feb. 5, 2022).
48
Harriet Ryan et al., “You Want a Description of Hell?” Oxycontin’s 12-Hour
Problem, L.A. TIMES, (May 5, 2016), https://www.latimes.com/projects/oxycontinpart1/ [https://perma.cc/9Y6G-NCNB].
49
The Editorial Board, An Opioid Crisis Foretold, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/21/opinion/an-opioid-crisis-foretold.html [https://
perma.cc/FK2G-NXD7].
50
Id.
51
Ryan et. al., supra note 48.
52
Id.
53
The Joint Commission: Over a Century of Quality and Safety, JOINT COMM’N
(2022), https://www.jointcommission.org/-/media/tjc/documents/about-us/tjchistory-timeline-through-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZW4Q-N8VC].
54
David W. Baker, Clarification of April 13, 2016, Statement on Pain
Management, JOINT COMM’N (Apr. 18, 2016), https://jointcommission.newmedia-release.com/2016_statement/downloads/April_2016_Pain_Statement.pdf
47
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numerical rating scales to assess pain in an effort to satisfy the
standards to continue to receive funding.55 Drug companies
capitalized on the need for better pain treatment methods and began
promoting opioid painkillers as the solution.56 The combination of
the Joint Commission’s standards for pain assessment and
treatment, as well as doctors more loosely prescribing opioids in
reliance upon drug companies’ manipulative marketing practices,
resulted in a massive spike in drug overdoses and deaths.57
Specifically, the CDC reported that “since 2000, the rate of deaths
from drug overdoses ha[d] increased 137% including a 200%
increase in the rate of overdose deaths involving opioids.”58 In 2016,
an “estimated 40% of opioid overdose deaths involved a
prescription opioid.”59
Today, the opioid epidemic rages on; the increase of opioid
prescriptions to treat pain has led to systemic misuse.60 The CDC’s
National Center for Health Statistics estimated that 100,306 drug
overdoses were attributed to opioids in the United States in the mere

[https://perma.cc/AZK3-QB2P] (“The Joint Commission first established
standards for pain assessment and treatment in 2001 in response to the national
outcry about the widespread problem of undertreatment of pain.”); see also David
W. Baker, The Joint Commission’s Pain Standards: Origins and Evolution, THE
JOINT COMM’N (May 5, 2017), https://www.jointcommission.org/-/media/
tjc/documents/resources/pain-management/pain_std_history_web_version_0512
2017pdf.pdf?db=web&hash=E7D12A5C3BE9DF031F3D8FE0D8509580&hash
=E7D12A5C3BE9DF031F3D8FE0D8509580 [https://perma.cc/6P9H-NMVX].
55
See Baker, The Joint Commission’s Pain Standards: Origins and Evolution,
supra note 54.
56
German Lopez, A Rising Death Toll, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/13/briefing/opioids-drug-overdose-deathtoll.html?searchResultPosition=1 [https://perma.cc/FJ3H-QKGG].
57
Id.
58
Increases in Drug and Opioid Overdose Deaths — United States, 2000–2014,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Jan. 1, 2016), https://www.cdc.gov/
mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6450a3.htm#:~:text=During%202014%2C%2047%2
C055%20drug%20overdose,in%202014%20(Figure%201). [https://perma.cc/3DAN35U5].
59
What Is the U.S. Opioid Epidemic?, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.
https://www.hhs.gov/opioids/about-the-epidemic/index.html [https://perma.cc/X36DWVJZ] (last visited Feb 5, 2022).
60
Id.
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span of a year (from April 2020 to April 2021).61 To put that
astonishing number into perspective, that number is an increase of
28.5% from the 78,056 drug overdose deaths during 202062 and is
also “more than vehicle crash and gun deaths combined.”63 In
addition to concerns about drug users overdosing on opioids, there
is also a concern for newborns experiencing withdrawal symptoms
from opioids as a result of their mothers’ use while pregnant.64
In the past two years alone, the drug epidemic has worsened.
Overdose deaths spiked 50% as fentanyl, a synthetic opioid, “spread
in illegal markets . . . [and] more people turned to drugs during the
pandemic, and treatment facilities and other services shut down.”65
Recognizing the severity of the opioid epidemic, the HHS declared
the opioid crisis an official “public health emergency” in October of
2017.66 In January of 2022, the HHS renewed its determination as a
result of the ongoing, tragic consequences of the opioid crisis.67
Despite widespread misuse of opioids since the early 2000s, the
drug epidemic was finally recognized as a public health emergency
in 2017 and has been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. With
an increased likelihood of death resulting from drug overdose and
the rising death toll, the current regulatory framework does not
reflect the severity of the opioid epidemic and telemedicine’s
contribution to the problem.
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Drug Overdose Deaths in the U.S. Top 100,000 Annually, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION (Nov. 17, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/pressroom/
nchs_press_releases/2021/20211117.htm [https://perma.cc/75PM-RT8R].
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Lopez, supra note 56.
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What is the U.S. Opioid Epidemic?, supra note 59.
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Lopez, supra note 56.
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Public Health Emergency Declarations, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., https://www.phe.gov/emergency/news/healthactions/phe/Pages/default.aspx
[https://perma.cc/ZL5T-VXCW] (last visited Feb. 5, 2022).
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IV. THE CURRENT ONLINE PHARMACY REGULATORY SCHEME
Telemedicine is regulated at both the federal and state level.68
There are only two primary pieces of legislation at the federal level:
the CSA and the RHA.69 Additionally, “all 50 states’ and
Washington DC’s laws, policies and regulations on telemedicine
differ significantly.”70 Finally, there is the DEA, a federal agency,
that has been delegated enforcement power of the federal
legislation.71
A. Federal Regulations of Online Pharmacies
The first major relevant federal legislation, the CSA,72 was
enacted in 1970 to “improve the manufacturing, importation and
exportation, distribution, and dispensing of controlled substances.”73
The CSA requires manufacturers, distributors, and dispensers of
controlled substances to register with the DEA, the agency with
enforcement authority under the Act.74 Ideally, this legislation
creates a “closed system” where controlled substances can be
adequately tracked throughout their cycle—from when they were
manufactured to when they reach a patient’s hand.75 Additionally,
the CSA imposes potential criminal liability “for any person to
knowingly or intentionally . . . manufacture, distribute, or dispense
. . . a controlled substance.”76

68

See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 829; see also Kichloo et al., supra note 1, at 2.
21 U.S.C. § 801 et. seq.; 21 U.S.C. § 829(e).
70
Kichloo et al., supra note 1, at 2.
71
21 C.F.R. § 1300.01.
72
21 U.S.C. § 802(6).
73
Michael Gabay, The Federal Controlled Substances Act: Schedules and
Pharmacy Registration, NAT’L CTR. FOR BIOTECH. INFO. (May 29, 2013),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3839489/
[https://perma.cc/
8VT3-SEF3]. 21 U.S.C. § 802(6) (“The term ‘controlled substance’ means a drug
or other substance, or immediate precursor, included in schedule I, II, III, IV, or
V of part B of this subchapter. The term does not include distilled spirits, wine,
malt beverages, or tobacco, as those terms are defined or used in subtitle E of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986.”).
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See id.
75
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21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
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In 1970, when the CSA was passed, the existence of online
pharmacies was obviously not considered. Modern telehealth
technology has exposed the insufficiency of the CSA as a
comprehensive regulatory mechanism. Congress became aware of
the CSA’s inadequacy to handle the byproducts of the technology
revolution in healthcare.77 One boy’s story in particular grabbed
Congress’s attention.
Ryan Haight was at the top of his class and loved to “attempt[]
all sports with great enthusiasm,” according to his mother, Francene,
who testified to the Judiciary Committee on May 16, 2007.78 When
Ryan was seventeen, he became involved in online chat rooms
where individuals encouraged him to get drugs for “experimental
purposes, fun, and to make him feel better.”79 Ryan navigated to one
of the websites, filled out a questionnaire, and a doctor, who had
never evaluated Ryan or performed an examination, prescribed him
Valium and Morphine.80 An internet pharmacy then delivered the
controlled substances right to his home.81 On February 12, 2001,
when Ryan was eighteen years old, his mother found him lifeless in
bed; he had overdosed on the prescribed drugs he easily obtained,
delivered right to his front door.82
At the plea of his mother and others, Congress passed the RHA
(formally, the Ryan Haight Online Pharmacy Consumer Protection
Act) in October 2008. The RHA amended the CSA by adding an
additional section on “Controlled substances dispensed by means of
the Internet.”83 This section provides that “[n]o controlled substance
. . . may be delivered, distributed, or dispensed by means of the
Internet without a valid prescription.”84 Under the RHA, a “valid
prescription” is “a prescription that is issued for a legitimate medical
77

Id. § 829(e)(1).
Ryan Haight Online Pharmacy Consumer Protection Act of 2008: Hearing
on H.R. 6353 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Congress (2007)
(statement of Francene Haight), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/
doc/haight_testimony_05_16_07.pdf [https://perma.cc/M22S-9UJ7].
79
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80
See id.
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See id.
82
See id.
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purpose in the usual course of professional practice by—(i) a
practitioner who has conducted at least 1 in-person medical
evaluation of the patient . . . .”85 Courts have interpreted the
language “legitimate medical purpose” to mean “generally accepted
medical practice.”86 Thus, one of the RHA’s most notable changes
to the CSA is that the prescription for a controlled substance cannot
be made without a doctor meeting with a patient in person at least
once.
The RHA also added stricter requirements for online
pharmacies, to be enforced by the DEA. Specifically, section 831,
titled, “Additional requirements relating to online pharmacies and
telemedicine,” specifies a list of disclosures online pharmacies must
clearly make on their internet site’s homepage.87 Included in this list
are disclosures of “[t]he name and address of the pharmacy as it
appears on the pharmacy’s Drug Enforcement Administration
certificate of registration” and “[t]he pharmacy’s telephone number
and email address.”88 The Statute also mandates online pharmacies
to clearly display on their website’s homepage a statement
indicating their compliance with section 831.89 The RHA also leaves
some regulatory power to the states:
Each online pharmacy shall comply with the requirements of State law
concerning the licensure of pharmacies in each State from which it, and
in each State to which it, delivers, distributes, or dispenses or offers to
deliver, distribute, or dispense controlled substances by means of the
Internet, pursuant to applicable licensure requirements, as determined by
each such State.90

In addition to directly affording states the power to regulate
pharmacies, the RHA requires the state licensure of the pharmacistin-charge to be disclosed on a pharmacy’s website, as well as a list
of every state where the pharmacy is “licensed to dispense
controlled substances.”91 Finally, the RHA also requires disclosure
of who the online pharmacy has a “contractual relationship [with] to
85

Id. § 829(e)(2)(A)(i).
United States v. Vamos, 797 F.2d 1146, 1151 (2d Cir. 1986).
87
21 U.S.C. § 831(c).
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Id. § 831 (c)(1)–(2).
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Id. § 831(a).
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Id. § 831(b).
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Id. § 831(c)(3)–(4).
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provide medical evaluations or issue prescriptions for controlled
substances . . . .” on the internet site’s homepage.92 The command
for online pharmacies to comply with the requirements of state law
is echoed in the Code of Federal Regulations (“CFR”) concerning
“Special Requirements for Online Pharmacies.”93
As enabled by section 821, the CFR addresses the regulation of
online pharmacies with respect to registration as part of the Uniform
Controlled Substances Act stating:
[I]t is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally fill a
prescription for a controlled substance that was issued in a manner that
constitutes dispensing by means of the Internet unless such person is a
pharmacist who is acting in the usual course of his professional practice
and is acting on behalf of a pharmacy whose registration has been
modified under sections 1301.13 and 1301.19 of this chapter to authorize
it to operate as an online pharmacy.94

Additionally, under section 821, the U.S. Attorney General is
“authorized to promulgate rules and regulations”95 and empowered
to delegate any of their designated functions to other government
officials.96 The Attorney General has delegated broad authority to
the DEA97 to regulate the distribution of controlled substances by
online pharmacies. The DEA exercised its enforcement power in
response to the HHS declaring a public health emergency
determination by announcing that some of the provisions of the
RHA would no longer be enforced.98
B. Public Health Emergency Limits Effect of the RHA
In March of 2020, HHS Secretary Alex Azar determined the
COVID-19 outbreak was a public health emergency, triggering an

92

Id. § 831(c).
21 C.F.R. § 1301.19.
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exception to the CSA.99 In announcing the exception, the DCD
stated that:
For as long as the Secretary’s designation of a public health emergency
remains in effect, DEA-registered practitioners in all areas of the United
States may issue prescriptions for all . . . controlled substances to patients
for whom they have not conducted an in-person medical evaluation,
provided all of the following conditions are met: [(1)] The prescription
is issued for a legitimate medical purpose by a practitioner acting in the
usual course of his/her professional practice; [(2)] The telemedicine
communication is conducted using an audio-visual, real-time, two-way
interactive communication system; and [(3)] The practitioner is acting in
accordance with applicable Federal and State laws.100

On January 14, 2022, the DEA renewed its determination due to
the “continued consequences” of the COVID-19 pandemic.101 This
renewal meant some provisions of the RHA were and continue to be
ineffective, such that controlled substances can be prescribed
without the in-person medical evaluation typically required.
Therefore, COVID-19 has removed what has been considered one
of the most prominent safeguards against illicit online pharmacies,
which is the in-person medical evaluation requirement of the RHA.
There has been much debate, however, over the efficacy and
desirability of the RHA in-person medical evaluation requirement.102
This debate necessitates the reconsideration of the desirability of an
in-person medical evaluation within the overall framework of
legislating in a way that allows for the maximization of protections
against illicit online pharmacies while minimizing the burdens it
places on those that are at risk of being denied needed virtual
medical care.

99
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C. State Regulations of Online Pharmacies
As briefly described above, the CSA and the RHA both
specifically delegate power to regulate online pharmacies to the
states. This delegation has resulted in inconsistent regulatory
frameworks amongst the states. As an example, North Carolina has
a rather robust set of Pharmacy Laws.103 In those Pharmacy Laws,
despite “COVID-19” appearing forty-five times, online pharmacies
are never directly addressed or even mentioned.104 But online
pharmacies are operations that are unique and distinct from
traditional pharmacies. Consequently, superimposing laws that were
passed to regulate brick-and-mortar pharmacies has been and likely
will continue to be insufficient to effectively abate the grave danger
posed by illicit online pharmacies.
Included in North Carolina’s Pharmacy Laws is the requirement
that “[e]very person who manufactures, distributes, dispenses, or
conducts research with any controlled substance within this State or
who proposes to engage in any of these activities shall annually
register with the North Carolina Department of Health and Human
Services” and pay a registration fee.105 In response to COVID-19,
Governor Roy Cooper sought to make access to controlled
substances easier with Executive Order No. 116, allowing customers
to receive their controlled substances using an expired driver’s
license or identification card.106
There are, however, some states that mention online pharmacies
explicitly in their Pharmacy Laws. For example, Indiana identifies
which state’s laws apply by asserting that online pharmacies shall
comply with “the licensure laws of the state in which the mail order
or internet based pharmacy is domiciled.”107 Relatedly, Illinois also
requires that any online pharmacy that provides any kind of
pharmaceutical services in Illinois abide by Illinois law on the
103
For a compilation of some of the Pharmacy Laws of North Carolina, see
Pharmacy Laws of North Carolina, N.C. BD. OF PHARM., (Sept. 2021),
http://www.ncbop.org/LawsRules/Statutes.pdf [https://perma.cc/7B2C-NPUD].
104
Id.
105
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-101.
106
Pharmacy Laws of North Carolina, supra note 103 at 80.
107
IND. CODE ANN. § 25-26-18-2(1).
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matter.108 Arkansas has a robust subsection on online pharmacies
and painstakingly discusses extensive requirements for both the
internet sales and the internet sites for the online pharmacies
themselves.109 Arkansas even includes a provision stating:
A pharmacist practicing within or outside Arkansas may not fill a
prescription order to dispense a prescription-only drug to a patient if the
pharmacist knows or reasonably should have known under the
circumstances that the prescription order was issued: (1) On the basis of:
(A) An internet questionnaire; (B) An internet consultation; or (C) A
telephonic consultation; and (2) Without a valid prior patient-practitioner
relationship.110

The deference to state regulation within the federal regulatory
scheme, in conjunction with erratic regulation at the state level,
demonstrates the difficulty of effective regulation of online
pharmacies in this new era of burgeoning telehealth services. These
deficiencies suggest that a universalized approach to the regulation
of online pharmacies would more effectively prevent the illegal
distribution of controlled substances. In addition, the inconsistencies
in protections provided against illicit online pharmacies requires
standardization to achieve the goal of maximizing the safeguards
against these pharmacies while avoiding unnecessary obstacles
preventing access to virtual medical care. Through the analysis of
prosecutions based on the present regulatory and enforcement
scheme under the CSA, it becomes clear that the criminal penalties
are not high enough and are underenforced, both in terms of the
number of prosecutions and the penalties imposed.
V.

AN ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS OF ILLICIT
ONLINE PHARMACIES
Several criminal cases provide insight into how these illicit
online pharmacies function. In U.S. v. Darji,111 the government
charged James Hazelwood and USMeds with conspiracy to
distribute controlled substances and several counts of unlawful drug

108

225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 85/16a.
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-92-1002.
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distribution due to their operation of an “internet pill mill.”112
Hazelwood created websites targeting potential customers seeking
to order prescription pain pills online and directed them to his
website by pushing his own websites when people searched phrases
such as “hydrocodone no prescription.”113 Once on his websites,
customers would “select the type of drug, the strength, and the
quantity desired.”114 In effect, his online business operations
functioned just like the website used by Ryan Haight.
This input from the customer could not be changed by any
doctor participating in the conspiracy.115 After a customer had nearly
completed the process by entering a payment method and delivery
address, the customer would fill out a short questionnaire.116 The
customer would then have an extremely brief telephone “consult”
with a doctor, which proved to be a mere formality.117 An
overwhelming majority of customers were approved with one doctor
authorizing “between 700 and 900 hydrocodone prescriptions a
week,” including prescriptions based on questionnaires providing
inadequate information to form the basis of such a prescription.118
Finally, the information would be sent to a pharmacy working with
the conspiracy that filled the order and shipped the medication to the
customer directly.119
When federal agents began investigating, they uncovered that
“the operation’s review of medical records was a sham.”120 One
undercover agent filled out a questionnaire, naming himself “Park
Rover” and described his medical complaints as “involv[ing] pain
resulting from running into a fence while chasing a ball, heartworms
and excessive barking.”121 Park Rover lived at “1523 Bark Street,”
was under the care of “Dr. Zachary Shihtzu,” and “listed his current
112
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114
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116
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medications as Kyltix (a substance used on dogs to repel or kill
ticks) and Nyla bone (a canine chew toy).”122
Park Rover successfully ordered hydrocodone on three separate
occasions.123 The organization transitioned to a “direct script” model
where they had co-conspirator doctors write prescriptions for
hydrocodone that they would ship directly to the customer so that
the customer could fill the prescription themselves.124 The parties
involved were ultimately convicted of drug-conspiracy, unlawful
drug distribution, and conspiracy to commit money laundering.125
Another case, U.S. v. Birbragher,126 highlights the international
component of these schemes, as well as the marketing and
advertising that these illicit online pharmacies employ. In
Birbragher, the company “Pharmacom” operated a website,
www.buymeds.com, where customers placed orders for controlled
substances requiring prescriptions by answering a short health
history questionnaire and providing a payment method.127 Then, a
doctor that was not even licensed to practice medicine anywhere in
the United States would review the order.128 The doctor never
conducted an in-person exam of any kind, and had often never even
glanced at the patient-customer’s medical records before the doctor
“digitally affixed” their signature to the prescription generated by
Pharmacon.129 In addition to the fact that international doctors not
licensed in the United States were signing these prescriptions,
Pharmacon spent $3.14 million for marketing and advertising to
target individuals trying to obtain controlled substances.130
In 2017, an in-depth study analyzed prosecutions of those
involved with illicit online pharmacies.131 Three striking discoveries
122
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were revealed. First, the charges of conspiracy to distribute
controlled substances and conspiracy to launder money were among
the most common charges in the United States.132
Second, the study also found: “Alarmingly, none of the cases
reviewed involved charges associated with serious bodily injury or
manslaughter for the negligent distribution or dispensing of
pharmaceuticals by physicians to patients with whom the physicians
never had contact,” despite the number of deaths associated with
those negligent distributions.133 The author of this study argued that
the absence of charges associated with serious bodily injury or
manslaughter was due to the “inability to prove intent to harm.”134
The study mentioned that doctors prescribing drugs that resulted in
deaths could be seen as negligent or reckless; however, the
likelihood of these charges resulting in convictions, as well as
prosecutors’ preference to avoid long trials with difficult burdens of
proof, have deterred bringing these cases.135
Third, and perhaps most surprising, was the revelation that
legitimate business entities actually paid the highest fines as a result
of their connection with the criminal operations of distributing illicit
drugs.136 The U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) reported that
“Google Forfeit[ed] $500 Million Generated by Online Ads &
Prescription Drug Sales by Canadian Online Pharmacies.”137 The
DOJ held Google accountable for “allowing online Canadian
Global Implications, J. MED. ACCESS e104 (Dec. 14, 2017), https://journals.
sagepub.com/doi/full/10.5301/maapoc.0000020 [https://perma.cc/34TZ-N7L8].
The study was conducted by first locating prosecutions within the narrow subject
matter of illicit online pharmacies and then cross referencing all of the defendants
identified in those cases through the Public Access to Court Electronic Records
(PACER). Id. After compiling the court documents from all of the cases found
from 2000-2016, the data was analyzed. See id.
132
See id. at e109.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
See id.
136
See id.
137
See Google Forfeits $500 Million Generated by Online Ads & Prescription
Drug Sales by Canadian Online Pharmacies, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Aug. 24, 2011),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/google-forfeits-500-million-generated-onlineads-prescription-drug-sales-canadian-online [https://perma.cc/6TJJ-5VJH].
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pharmacies to place advertisements through its AdWords program
targeting consumers in the United States, resulting in the unlawful
importation of controlled and non-controlled prescriptions into the
United States.”138 Given the amount of resources these criminal
enterprises delegate to marketing and advertisements,139 holding
search engines such as Google accountable could be an important
piece of the puzzle in enforcing regulations of illicit online
pharmacies, especially considering the current, state-focused
regulatory framework.
The study concluded that, “given the clear patient risk associated
with the operation of illicit online pharmacies (including the sale of
controlled substances), penalties imposed by federal prosecutors do
not appear to have parity”140 in that the penalties are not harsh
enough to deter the dangerous distribution of highly-addictive
prescription drugs.141 Their profits are produced by inflating the “fill
fees” to as much as $20 to $25 , which is “more than ten times the
national average” of prescriptions given by pharmacies with
physical locations.142 One criminal enterprise was able to generate
approximately $160 million in sales and $126 million in revenue in
the span of two years.143
One of the major concerns with the inadequacy of the penalties
is the wide variety of punishments.144 The study revealed that the
maximum sentence in the data collection was thirty years of
imprisonment, while the lightest punishment included no
imprisonment or probation.145 Likewise, the study reflected a similar
variance in restitution ranging from $0 to more than $24 million.146
As a helpful illustration, Dr. Ogle, the doctor who authorized Ryan
Haight’s deadly prescription drugs,147 was sentenced to a mere
138
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twenty-four months in prison and ordered to pay approximately
$8,000 in restitution to Ryan’s parents.148
The inconsistency in application, as well as the markedly low
punishments associated with overdose deaths, is concerning. For
example, in one case involving a patient’s death due to overdose,
two doctors were charged with: (1) distribution of controlled
substances, (2) conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, (3)
distributing of misbranded drugs, (4) aiding & abetting, (5) wire
fraud, (6) money laundering, and (7) criminal forfeiture.149 Yet, one
doctor only received three years’ probation and eight-hundred hours
of community service. Another received a two-year prison sentence
and three years’ supervised release with ninety-six hours of
community service. Significantly, these penalties appear
inconsequential when these doctors’ actions led to the loss of life of
an individual. The grave danger these illicit online pharmacies pose
to the general public should be reflected in the severity and
consistency of sentencing included in the forthcoming regulation of
illicit online pharmacies.
VI.
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The combination of relatively minor penalties with a weak
regulatory framework is an extremely dangerous threat to the
public’s safety in a time when telemedicine is rapidly growing. The
DCD has made its decision to temporarily render the in-person
medical evaluation requirement ineffective based on a fear that
those needing controlled substances would be prevented from access
in the midst of the COVID-19 public health emergency. This choice
creates the opportunity to reconsider the need for the in-person
evaluations and reconceptualize the goals of further regulations of
illicit online pharmacies.
While access to needed medications is a legitimate interest of
the federal government, the DCD’s attempt to limit the danger
created by the removal of important amendments to the CSA in
enumerating a list of conditions is not a satisfactory substitution to
prevent mass distribution of controlled substances. Further, the
148
149
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regulatory framework is not sufficient to effectively manage the risk
that illicit online pharmacies pose to the general public,
necessitating an alternative approach. In the future, regardless of the
form of the regulation, the emphasis should be placed on
maximizing the protections afforded against illicit online
pharmacies circumventing regulations to distribute controlled
substances illegally, while minimizing the obstacles that prevent
safe, affordable access to medical care.
A. Model State Legislation for States to Regulate Online Pharmacies
One viable remedy to fill the cracks in the present regulatory
scheme would be to utilize the Uniform Law Commission to draft a
model statutory framework to be adopted by the individual states in
an effort to standardize the regulation of online pharmacies. This
framework would provide a potential solution to one of the most
serious current regulatory problems: inconsistencies amongst
regulatory frameworks in various states. Consistency is especially
important given that the distribution of controlled substances now
transcends borders through telehealth and online pharmacies. With
some state pharmacy laws designating the proper choice-of-law and
others remaining silent on this issue, this variance poses yet another
burden to prosecuting those involved with illicit online pharmacies
distributing controlled substances.
However, this suggestion will likely prove to be ineffective as it
cannot adequately address one of the largest concerns with the
current regulatory framework that is a patchwork of legislation from
state to state. Proposing a Model State Legislation will give the
states the option to consider passing it; however, the Model
Legislation is nothing more than a choice. States can choose to adopt
the Model Legislation in its entirety, make changes, or not adopt it
at all.
Significantly, controlled substances dispensed via online
pharmacies cross state lines, even international borders, quite
frequently. Model State Legislation cannot provide the necessary
regulation given the prevalent problem of determining which
jurisdiction’s law applies in a given case. As demonstrated by
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Birbragher,150 the head of an illicit pharmacy operation can be
located in one state, the doctor making the bogus prescriptions in
another, the pharmacy filling the prescriptions in yet another, and
the website reaching and serving customers in all fifty states.
In addition to the persistent patchwork problem, adoption of
Model State Legislation would be a slow solution, as there is no
mandated time frame for adopting the legislation through enactment
or even a mandate that the legislation ever be adopted or enacted.
This volition is a pressing problem; there is not enough time to wait
for state after state to hopefully adopt the Model State Legislation.
By perpetuating inconsistencies in the protections afforded against
illicit online pharmacies, this solution fails to maximize protections
across all fifty states. For this reason, amongst others, a
comprehensive federal regulatory approach is preferable.
B. The Preferable, Long-term Solution: Congressional Action
To address the pressing needs produced by dangers posed by
online pharmacies in light of the opioid epidemic in the midst of the
COVID-19 pandemic, Congress should step in and pass a statute
that standardizes the regulation of online pharmacies. Congress has
the ability and the resources to carefully weigh the benefits and costs
of future legislation to strike a balance between placing adequate
safeguards against illicit online pharmacies while being cognizant
to avoid unnecessarily impeding access to medical care.
Significantly, many of the concerns that motivated the passage of
the RHA still ring true today.
First, concern over the alarming rise in the abuse of prescription
controlled substances151 is still highly prevalent, even more prevalent
than it was in 2008 when the RHA was passed. As mentioned in Part
II, the opioid epidemic has raged on. The epidemic prompted the
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See United States v. Birbragher, 603 F.3d 478, 478 (8th Cir. 2010).
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declaration of a public health emergency in 2017,152 and that public
health emergency is still in full effect.153
The second concern included in the Senate Report conducted
prior to the passage of the RHA, namely the “lack of effective
controls over prescribed controlled substances distributed by rogue
internet pharmacies,”154 has also not been resolved post-RHA. The
concern that the internet provides the perfect marketplace for drug
traffickers remains true today.155 The rapid shift to telemedicine has
allowed illicit online pharmacies to flourish as individuals take to
the Internet to find prescription drugs. The RHA has failed to
provide “effective controls over prescribed controlled substances,”
as evidenced by the increase in overdose deaths during the
pandemic.156 Thus, the “demonstrated need for a federal legislative
solution” remains true.157
Given the nature of the online pharmacy industry, these
activities related to manufacturing, prescribing, and ultimately
distributing controlled substances are constantly crossing state lines.
It is clear that the Commerce Clause’s expansive reach provides
Congress with the power to enact legislation on this point.158 Not
only is it possible, but it is also the most efficient way to solve the
patchwork state legislation by providing a uniform, cohesive set of
legislation that governs all of the states (and preempts those state
laws that conflict). This legislation should be aimed specifically at
regulating the activities of online pharmacies within the greater
context of telemedicine. Other pharmacy regulations will still be left
to the states to determine for themselves, preserving the tradition of
federalism in this area of the law.
This federal legislation should include stricter standards for
operation, higher criminal penalties to increase deterrence, and
152
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permanent removal of the in-person requirement, which is currently
ineffective due to the ongoing public health emergency. Although
the RHA lays out requirements that online pharmacies must meet to
be properly registered, more is needed. Specifically, the legislation
should explicitly ban the use of questionnaires as a satisfactory basis
on which to write a prescription and prescribe a more holistic
approach that is accepted within the medical community. In physical
doctors’ offices, controlled substances are often locked away and
even counted to make sure that they are all there, and yet, online
pharmacy regulations include no comparable safeguards
proportional to the addictiveness and dangers posed by opioids.159
Providing for stricter standards of operation would provide
additional protections while not affecting, and more specifically not
encumbering, access to virtual medical care.
In addition to stricter standards of operation, the criminal
penalties must be higher. As mentioned in the study discussed in
Part V above, the data strongly suggests that a lack of severity of
criminal sentences for involvement in illicit online pharmacies is an
insufficient deterrent.160 Additionally, the Senate Report indicated
that the penalties for the most commonly distributed controlled
substances over the Internet were “too lenient.”161 Specifically, the
penalties have to be high enough such that the massive payout these
criminals receive for illegally distributing controlled substances is
outweighed by the strict penalties resulting in general deterrence.
Moreover, the penalties should be applied more consistently across
cases in various states. This effort of increasing deterrence of illicit
online pharmacies will also expand protections while not affecting
those that are in compliance with the relevant statutes. Although
heightened criminal penalties may improve deterrence, the primary
focus of the legislation should be directing the DEA and related
agencies to prioritize the development of enforcement strategies.

159
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C. The Preferable, Immediate Solution: Increasing Enforcement
Through the DEA
The DEA, and more specifically the DCD, is the best situated
regulating body to immediately implement guidance that aims to
maximize protections against illicit online pharmacies, while
minimizing obstacles that inhibit access to virtual medical care to
individuals who need it most. In fact, the mission statement of the
Division aligns well with this framework, stating, “[t]he mission of
DEA’s [DCD] is to prevent, detect, and investigate the diversion of
controlled pharmaceuticals and listed chemicals from legitimate
sources while ensuring an adequate and uninterrupted supply for
legitimate medical, commercial, and scientific needs.”162
Furthermore, the ability to act more quickly than waiting for
Congress, perhaps indefinitely, makes looking to this federal
Agency for regulation and guidance the solution best tailored to the
time-sensitive nature, given the immense danger produced by illicit
online pharmacies.
The Attorney General has delegated broad, sweeping
enforcement power to the DEA, which, in turn, has relied upon the
DCD to regulate the distribution of controlled substances.163 One
tactic that has been deployed by the DEA as a means of investigation
and enforcement includes federal agents submitting fabricated
questionnaires.164 In 2006 and 2007, the DEA also enlisted
wholesalers of controlled substances for their help by “pressur[ing]
hydrocodone wholesalers to cease supplying the drug to pharmacies
with abnormally high-volume ordering patterns.”165 Unfortunately,
the aspect of anonymity poses a unique problem within the context
of illicit online pharmacies that is difficult for the DEA to
overcome.166 The Agency has attempted to track down the criminal
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masterminds behind these schemes, but information on the illicit
pharmacies’ websites is often false.167
One way to increase the effectiveness of DEA enforcement is to
assemble a congressional commission, specifically a task force to
develop ways to enhance enforcement. This effort may include the
further development of artificial intelligence with the ability to
recognize patterns of drug distributor content in limited data sets,
such as user habits on the platform of Instagram, in order to locate
similar content on the Internet.168 This technology could be utilized
to identify online pharmacies that are not in compliance with the
regulations, flagging them for further investigation. As the cases
discussed in Section IV above illustrate, these illicit online
pharmacies often target customers through advertisements. Thus,
delegating resources to investigate the search engines that are
producing particular results could be effective.
Additionally, the DEA may need to utilize the expertise of other
agencies. For example, the DEA could call upon the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (“FBI”) to utilize its resources as the “the lead
federal agency for investigating cyber-attacks and intrusions”169 and
the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) specifically to capitalize
on its collection of foreign intelligence170 to combat international
illicit online pharmacies. By utilizing these agencies’ resources, in
addition to the DEA’s, it may be possible to gather more evidence,
allowing prosecutors to charge violators with negligent homicide,
manslaughter, or murder.
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On top of additional funding and resources delegated to support
the DCD, the DEA can leverage its enforcement power to provide
additional clarification of the ambiguous language of the governing
statute by implementing a Know Your Customer (“KYC”) standard.
The governing statute defines a valid prescription as one “that is
issued for a legitimate medical purpose in the usual course of
professional practice.”171 This ambiguity provides the DCD the
opportunity to provide guidance on what “the usual course of
professional practice” means within the niche area of online
pharmacies. One possible route would be to implement a KYC
standard that has been invoked by the Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (known as “FinCEN”) and U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission to require financial institutions to “make
efforts to prove the identity, suitability, and inherent risks of that
individual in order to reduce fraud and abuse.”172
Translated to the medical field, this standard would require
doctors to take additional steps to gain a more holistic picture of
patient health that is unobtainable in the questionnaires that are
currently utilized on illicit online pharmacy websites. These steps
may require physicians to obtain a patient’s complete medical
history from all providers, review that medical history with the
patient, and make sure that there is not an abnormal number of refill
requests for controlled substances.173 The application of the KYC
standard to govern prescribing physicians and their patients would
provide additional safeguards without placing undue burdens upon
those patients who rely on virtual access to medical care.
In addition to investigation and enforcement of regulations, the
DCD should also release additional reports and guidance documents
to educate both pharmacists and potential consumers about illicit
online pharmacies and what to do if they encounter one. A study
conducted in 2021 revealed that out of the 347 pharmacist
participants, 58% expressed a lack of confidence in counseling
patients on how to identify online pharmacies that are operating
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illegally.174 Further, 75% of the pharmacists were not familiar with
resources to help their patients “identify safe and legitimate online
pharmacies.”175 Thus, it is just as important to educate pharmacists
as it is to educate the ultimate consumers of controlled substances.
Encouraging physicians to discuss where their patients may be
getting drugs, making sure they are getting legitimate prescriptions
from legal sources, and equipping them with the knowledge to do so
is imperative. Although the DCD has a form to fill out on its website
to report suspected illicit online pharmacies,176 the website should
also include additional educational materials related to these illegal
operations under its listed resources. In conjunction with these
efforts, education about the opioid epidemic itself is also crucial.
Highlighting the addictiveness and danger that opioids cause and
actively trying to discourage individuals from seeking opioids from
illegal sources in the first place will help to at least make the illicit
online pharmacy schemes less profitable.
Further, the DCD can utilize large corporations that play a role
in such schemes to gain information into these complex criminal
organizations.177 Companies, such as Google, and other entities, like
the Post Office, are uniquely situated to identify or observe this
illegal conduct and should thus bear a level of responsibility for
policing online pharmacies, as suggested in Part V above. Since
2018, members of Congress have urged companies such as Google,
Microsoft, Yahoo, and Pinterest to direct users only to legitimate
pharmacies and prohibit searches of illicit drugs, “[r]equiring each
platform to report to law enforcement when that platform receives
information indicating that a company wants to advertise the use of
or sale of illicit narcotics.”178 Encouraging these corporations to flag
174
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this specific type of criminal conduct and report it to the appropriate
authorities should be a goal of the DCD’s enforcement efforts.179
Before the passage of the RHA, the DEA urged Congress that
increased enforcement was not enough and that the dangers posed
by illicit online pharmacies distributing controlled substances
required legislative action.180 Even today, legislative action from
Congress should still be encouraged in conjunction with relying
upon the DEA and the DCD in the fight against illicit online
pharmacies.
VII. CONCLUSION
The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated the development of an
increasingly virtual world.181 Schools have been taught remotely at
all levels of academia, families open presents for holidays on video
calls, and remote workers show no signs of returning to the office.
Within this virtual universe, telemedicine has become a vital
platform for the administration of medical care, given the ongoing
opioid epidemic. Despite its many benefits, the rapid shift to
telemedicine has created the perfect breeding ground for illicit
online pharmacies to take root and develop into complex criminal
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enterprises. These illicit online pharmacies provide a way for
individuals to find a website, complete a questionnaire that is not
reviewed in any meaningful way, and receive opioids right on their
front step without ever interacting with a physician.
Given the rapid development in technology that has made these
illicit online pharmacies possible, it is imperative to have
standardized regulation of the distribution of opioids and other
controlled substances that accounts for these developments and
appreciates the severity of potential consequences. The RHA was
designed to amend the CSA to account for online pharmacies but
has not achieved its aims. Controlled substance use is still rampant.
The RHA’s requirement of an in-person evaluation has been
circumvented by the declaration of COVID-19 as a public health
emergency, providing cause for reevaluating the provision’s
inclusion in future legislation.
More must be done to maximize protections against illicit online
pharmacies. This goal cannot be viewed in isolation but rather must
always be balanced against the social cost of placing obstacles that
unintentionally prevent access to necessary, virtual medical care.
There must be stricter standards of operation that ban the use of
questionnaires and prescribe requirements in alignment with
generally accepted medical practice. There must also be stricter
penalties, but most importantly, there needs to be attention, time,
and money diverted towards the development of enforcement
strategies developed by the DCD of the DEA and members of a
designated task force.
Federal legislation is desirable since telemedicine and online
pharmacies transcend state borders. Congress is uniquely situated to
standardize the regulation across all states. Although the legislation
process at the federal level can be lengthy, it is still the preferable
solution given the potential devastating consequences of Congress’s
failure to act.
If Congress is not receptive to the idea of passing such
legislation, a second option is to create a State Model Legislation
and encourage its adoption by individual states. This Model
Legislation will help address some of the most immediate concerns
and may also capture Congress’s attention. Ultimately, however, the
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preferable short-term solution is to encourage the DCD to increase
enforcement and produce additional guidance and educational
materials.
Although hopefully the COVID-19 pandemic will eventually
come to an end, its impacts on the delivery of medical care will
likely persist. The blending of telemedicine with the opioid
epidemic has created a deathly combination that will continue to
have devastating effects if left to be regulated by a patchwork of
state-level legislation. Now is the time to regulate online pharmacies
in an effort to mitigate the potential disadvantages of telemedicine,
thereby allowing the benefits to flourish and provide more effective
and expedient healthcare services to those who need them most.

